HICAGO -- During the interval between the terrorist
attacks and the United States response, a reporter called to ask me
if the events of Sept. 11 meant the end of postmodernist relativism.
It seemed bizarre that events so serious would be linked causally
with a rarefied form of academic talk. But in the days that
followed, a growing number of commentators played serious variations
on the same theme: that the ideas foisted upon us by postmodern
intellectuals have weakened the country's resolve. The problem,
according to the critics, is that since postmodernists deny the
possibility of describing matters of fact objectively, they leave us
with no firm basis for either condemning the terrorist attacks or
fighting back.
Not so. Postmodernism maintains only that there can be no
independent standard for determining which of many rival
interpretations of an event is the true one. The only thing
postmodern thought argues against is the hope of justifying our
response to the attacks in universal terms that would be persuasive
to everyone, including our enemies. Invoking the abstract notions of
justice and truth to support our cause wouldn't be effective anyway
because our adversaries lay claim to the same language. (No one
declares himself to be an apostle of injustice.)
Instead, we can and should invoke the particular lived values
that unite us and inform the institutions we cherish and wish to
defend.
At times like these, the nation rightly falls back on the record
of aspiration and accomplishment that makes up our collective
understanding of what we live for. That understanding is sufficient,
and far from undermining its sufficiency, postmodern thought tells
us that we have grounds enough for action and justified condemnation
in the democratic ideals we embrace, without grasping for the empty
rhetoric of universal absolutes to which all subscribe but which all
define differently.
But of course it's not really postmodernism that people are
bothered by. It's the idea that our adversaries have emerged not
from some primordial darkness, but from a history that has equipped
them with reasons and motives and even with a perverted version of
some virtues. Bill Maher, Dinesh D'Souza and Susan Sontag have
gotten into trouble by pointing out that "cowardly" is not the word
to describe men who sacrifice themselves for a cause they believe
in.
Ms. Sontag grants them courage, which she is careful to say is a
"morally neutral" term, a quality someone can display in the
performance of a bad act. (Milton's Satan is the best literary
example.) You don't condone that act because you describe it
accurately. In fact, you put yourself in a better position to
respond to it by taking its true measure. Making the enemy smaller
than he is blinds us to the danger he presents and gives him the
advantage that comes along with having been underestimated.
That is why what Edward Said has called "false universals" should
be rejected: they stand in the way of useful thinking. How many
times have we heard these new mantras: "We have seen the face of
evil"; "these are irrational madmen"; "we are at war against
international terrorism." Each is at once inaccurate and unhelpful.
We have not seen the face of evil; we have seen the face of an enemy
who comes at us with a full roster of grievances, goals and
strategies. If we reduce that enemy to "evil," we conjure up a
shape- shifting demon, a wild-card moral anarchist beyond our
comprehension and therefore beyond the reach of any
counterstrategies.
The same reduction occurs when we imagine the enemy as
"irrational." Irrational actors are by definition without rhyme or
reason, and there's no point in reasoning about them on the way to
fighting them. The better course is to think of these men as bearers
of a rationality we reject because its goal is our destruction. If
we take the trouble to understand that rationality, we might have a
better chance of figuring out what its adherents will do next and
preventing it.
And "international terrorism" does not adequately describe what
we are up against. Terrorism is the name of a style of warfare in
service of a cause. It is the cause, and the passions informing it,
that confront us. Focusing on something called international
terrorism ?detached from any specific purposeful agenda ?only
confuses matters. This should have been evident when President
Vladimir Putin of Russia insisted that any war against international
terrorism must have as one of its objectives victory against the
rebels in Chechnya.
When Reuters decided to be careful about using the word
"terrorism" because, according to its news director, one man's
terrorist is another man's freedom fighter, Martin Kaplan, associate
dean of the Annenberg School for Communication at the University of
Southern California, castigated what he saw as one more instance of
cultural relativism. But Reuters is simply recognizing how unhelpful
the word is, because it prevents us from making distinctions that
would allow us to get a better picture of where we are and what we
might do. If you think of yourself as the target of terrorism with a
capital T, your opponent is everywhere and nowhere. But if you think
of yourself as the target of a terrorist who comes from somewhere,
even if he operates internationally, you can at least try to
anticipate his future assaults.
?BR> Is this the end of
relativism? If by relativism one means a cast of mind that renders
you unable to prefer your own convictions to those of your
adversary, then relativism could hardly end because it never began.
Our convictions are by definition preferred; that's what makes them
our convictions. Relativizing them is neither an option nor a
danger.
But if by relativism one means the practice of putting yourself
in your adversary's shoes, not in order to wear them as your own but
in order to have some understanding (far short of approval) of why
someone else might want to wear them, then relativism will not and
should not end, because it is simply another name for serious
thought.
Stanley Fish, dean of the college of liberal
arts and sciences at the University of Illinois at Chicago, is the
author, most recently, of "How Milton Works."