SLAMABAD, Pakistan, Nov. 21 ?In a reception room at a Taliban ministry of defense building in Kabul, a brightly colored map depicting the American military presence in the Arabian peninsula was painted on a wall. An identical map appears in a book written by Osama bin Laden declaring a holy war on the United States.

Although it has long been known that Mr. bin Laden had great influence over the Taliban, the full extent of the ties may become clearer as more documents are seized and more insiders come forward.

The picture ?still far from complete ?is of a relationship nourished by Mr. bin Laden's access to vast wealth, ties that ultimately led an essentially Afghan religious movement into a more global jihad and, eventually, doom.

One of the primary reasons Mr. bin Laden exerted so much influence over Afghanistan was clearly his relationship with Mullah Muhammad Omar, the one-time clerk who rose to become spiritual leader of the Taliban, which sealed control over most of Afghanistan after taking over Kabul in 1996.

Insiders say Mullah Omar and Mr. bin Laden spent many hours in deep discussion of the intricacies of Islam, often by the light of kerosene lamps in the hideouts both men resorted to as the world's pressures against them mounted. Mr. bin Laden played to the mullah's vanity by declaring him caliph, a title reserved through the 1,400-year history of Islam for the leader of the faithful.

In turn, the Taliban leader turned his back on most of the rest of the world to support his patron.

Interviews with intelligence officials in Pakistan and Kabul, and conversations with knowledgeable residents in the Afghan capital present a picture of a growing closeness between the two men.

Sometime in the last year, Mr. bin Laden swore "bayat," an Islamic oath of fealty, to Mullah Omar. By January of this year, at the wedding of one of his sons, the terrorist leader began to call Mullah Omar the caliph.

In return, the Taliban leader provided a base and protection for Al Qaeda, Mr. bin Laden's organization, and assented as Mr. bin Laden sent out videotapes calling on Muslims worldwide to commit their sons and their money to the terrorist camps he established in the remote deserts and mountains of Afghanistan.

This closeness raises many questions that, for now, have not been adequately answered. Why, for instance, did Saudi Arabia continue to recognize and support the Taliban government until after the Sept. 11 attacks even as the country proclaimed Mr. bin Laden to be an enemy?

When the State Department announced tens of millions of dollars in drought relief for a Taliban-led Afghanistan earlier this year, how aware was it of Mr. bin Laden's influence over the government?

The terrorists who went to Afghanistan were more resolute in their sense of Islam than the Afghan militants, according to a Western intelligence official who spent time in the country during the 1990's.

"The Afghans were in awe and fear of the Arabs who had this much deeper commitment," the official said.

Not all of the Arabs, Pakistanis and others who went to Afghanistan to fight were members of Al Qaeda, but those who were received special treatment as the royalty of terrorism.

Residents of Kabul complained this week that they lived under a virtual occupation by Arabs and Pakistanis during the Taliban's rule. They described thousands of Pakistanis and Arabs roaming the streets of the city as an elite that enforced its own strict moral and religious code on the population.

Poverty-stricken Afghans watched in envy as the government gave foreigners the biggest homes in upper- class neighborhoods. The Arabs drove new Japanese-made pickup trucks and ate out at restaurants nightly.

Muhammad Sadiq, a shopkeeper in the Wasir Akbar Khan section of Kabul, the wealthy former diplomatic quarter where Al Qaeda members occupied several houses, said Arabs and other foreign volunteers in the area were good customers. But he added: "In my heart I was angry at them. They were invaders."

As the power of Mr. bin Laden and his network grew, so did the rumors. Commanders of the rebel Northern Alliance said Mullah Omar had turned into a puppet of the terrorist leader. One tool used by alliance commanders to motivate their troops in recent weeks has been the argument that their country had been taken over by foreigners.

Prince Turki bin Faisal, who recently stepped down as chief of intelligence for Saudi Arabia, said he saw the change in Mullah Omar over the course of a few months in 1998, when he twice visited Kandahar, the mullah's southern stronghold, to try to persuade the Taliban to extradite Mr. bin Laden to Saudi Arabia for trial on charges of advocating the overthrow of the royal family.

In June of that year, Mullah Omar promised to give Mr. bin Laden to the Saudis. By the time the intelligence chief returned in September, the Taliban leader had reversed his decision. He had also adopted Mr. bin Laden's position on many issues, including Saudi Arabia.

"Mullah Omar started using harsh language against the kingdom," the prince said in an interview today. "He used the same words that bin Laden uses, about the presence of infidel troops despoiling the land of the two holy mosques and people have a right to declare a jihad to liberate the holy land from these infidel operators."

Along with the personal bond between the two men, there was the Taliban's deepening financial dependence on Mr. bin Laden, whose fortune may have run dry in the 1990's but who remained a conduit for millions of dollars donated to his cause through charities and front organizations by wealthy Saudis and other Arabs.

Some contributors apparently believed in the vision of holy war or favored terrorist strikes on America; some other powerful figures in Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries seemed to be buying protection against the possibility that Mr. bin Laden's version of Islamic militancy might one day sweep away the Persian Gulf monarchies.

The money built hospitals and training camps for terrorists, and, intelligence officials said, bought weapons for the Taliban and the Arabs and other Muslims who flocked to Afghanistan.

The rising influence of the outsiders caused tensions in the Taliban, with some elements ?including the foreign minister and health minister, a Pakistani government official said ?expressing resentment. But no one was able to dislodge Mr. bin Laden.

"It was not a seamless relationship, but the Taliban became dependent on bin Laden and Al Qaeda resources, and the outsiders exerted more and more influence over the government," a Western diplomat in the region said.

A Pakistani official blamed Mr. bin Laden and his associates for persuading the Taliban to destroy the giant statues of Buddha in Bamyan Province, which were among the most revered monuments in the Buddhist world.

He also said the hard-line foreigners had persuaded the Taliban to harass United Nations workers into fleeing the country and to prosecute eight Christian aid workers.

Well before Mr. bin Laden's arrival in 1996, the Taliban had taken steps to isolate their country and return to strict interpretations of the Koran. In addition, many Taliban leaders and fighters had fought alongside foreign Muslims who helped them drive out Soviet troops in the 1980's.

The Taliban's brand of radical Islam was rooted in the code and culture of Afghan village life. Mullah Omar and his compatriots did not show the slightest concern about the outside world until Mr. bin Laden appeared on the scene.

Under the tutelage of his guest, Mullah Omar began to see his goal as more than the liberation of Afghanistan and he progressively signed on to the idea of a worldwide jihad against the United States.

Still, differences remained. "There was a closeness, but I would not go as far as saying bin Laden was the de facto defense minister," a Western diplomat said. "The Taliban and Al Qaeda were not one and the same."

Some of the evidence left behind in the Defense Ministry house indicated the gap between Mr. bin Laden, the guest under fire, and Mullah Omar, the beleaguered protector.

In an exchange of letters full of theological reasoning, Mr. bin Laden asked Mullah Omar not to turn him over to the Americans, and the Taliban leader granted his request.

But items left in the ministry building and houses occupied by Al Qaeda members showed that the Taliban government aided the terrorist network's operations inside Afghanistan.

Documents showed that Al Qaeda was closely integrated with the Taliban Ministry of Defense in the field. For instance, maps of front-line Taliban positions across the country were found in Al Qaeda houses, and neighbors said the men who lived in the houses regularly traveled to the front lines.

While some of Al Qaeda's men may be trapped in the northwestern Afghan city of Kunduz, most seem to have vanished along with their leader.

What is clear is that Mullah Omar and Mr. bin Laden are separated and have no way of communicating.

Tayab Agha, the mullah's secretary, told reporters in the Afghan city of Spin Boldak today that the Taliban did not know where Mr. bin Laden was and that what was left of the government no longer had a relationship with the man who brought the might of the United States and its allies down on Afghanistan.