Theory and
Policy:
Ideas Have
Consequences
Theory
is dismissed frequently as mere empty ruminations‑fun, perhaps, but not
something for which practical men and women have time. But this is a short‑sighted
view, for as Thomas Szasz (1987) has cautioned, "ideas have
consequences" (Weaver, 1948). Theory matters.
When it
comes to making criminal justice policy, there is ample evidence of this maxim
(Sherman & Hawkins, 1981). Lawlessness is a costly problem; people lose
their property and sometimes their lives. The search for the sources of crime,
then, is not done within a vacuum. Even if a theorist wishes only to ruminate
about the causes of theft or violence, others will be ready to use these
insights to direct efforts to do something about the crime problem.
Understanding why crime occurs, then, is a prelude to developing strategies to
control the behavior. Stephen Pfohl (1985) has captured nicely the inherent
relationship between theory and policy:
Theoretical
perspectives provide us with an image of what something is and how we might
best act toward it. They name something this type of thing and not that. They provide us with the sense of being in a
world of relatively fixed forms and content. Theoretical perspectives transform
a mass of raw sensory data into understanding, explanations, and recipes for
appropriate action. (Pp. 9‑10)
This
discussion also leads to the realization that different theories suggest
different ways to reduce crime. Depending on what is proposed as the cause of
illegal behavior, certain criminal justice policies and practices will seem
reasonable; others will seem irrational and perhaps dangerously irresponsible.
Thus if offenders are viewed as genetically deranged and untrainable, much like
wild animals, then caging them would seem to be the only option available. But
if offenders are thought to be mentally ill, the solution to the problem would
be to give them psychotherapy. Or if one believes that people are moved to
crime by the strains of economic deprivation, providing job training and access
to employment opportunities would seem to hold the promise of diminishing
their waywardness.
This is
not to assert that the relationship between theory and policy is complicated.
Sometimes theories emerge and then the demand to change policy occurs;
sometimes policies are implemented and then attempts are made to justify the
policies by popularizing theories supportive of these reforms; often the
process is interactive with the theory and policy legitimating one another. In
any case, the important point is that support for criminal justice policies
will collapse eventually if the theory on which they are based no longer makes
sense.
An
important observation follows from this discussion: As theories of crime
change, so do criminal justice policies. At the turn of the century, many
Americans felt that criminals were "atavistic reversions" to less
civilized evolutionary forms or, at the least, feebleminded. The call to
sterilize offenders so that they could not pass criminogenic genes to their
offspring is accepted widely as prudent social action. Within two decades,
however, citizens were more convinced that the causes of crime lay not within
offenders themselves but in the pathology of their environments. The time was
ripe to hear suggestions that efforts be made to "save" slum youths
by setting up neighborhood delinquency prevention programs or, when necessary,
by removing juveniles to reformatories, where they could obtain the supervision
and treatment they desperately needed. More recently, numerous politicians have
climbed on the bandwagon that claims that crime is caused by the permissiveness
that has crept into the nation's families, schools, and correctional system.
Not surprisingly, they have urged that efforts be made to "get tough"
with offenders, to teach them that crime does not pay by sending them to prison
for lengthier stays and in record numbers.
We must
remember, however, not to decontextualize criminological theory: The very
changes in theory that undergird changes in policy are themselves a product of
transformations in society. As noted above, explanations of crime are linked
intimately to social context‑to the experiences people have that make a
given theory seem silly or sensible. Thus it is only when shifts in society
occur that theoretical models gain or lose credence and, in turn, gain or lose
the ability to justify a range of criminal justice policies.
We hope
as well that the reader will find the discussion of some personal relevance. We
have suggested that thought be given to how your own context may have shaped your thinking; now we suggest that similar thought be
given to how your thinking may have
shaped what you have thought should
be done about crime. The challenge we are offering is for you to reconsider the
basis and consistency of your views on crime and its control‑to
reconsider which theory you should embrace and the consequences this idea
should have. We hope that our book will aid you as you embark on this
adventure.